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1. Introduction 
Political decisions are sometimes either made by ex-
perts or are based on expert knowledge. This gives rise 
to what may be called epistemic dependence (Hardwig, 
1985). By epistemic dependence I refer to a situation 
where the reasons for making a particular decision in 
part or entirely are made with reference to knowledge 
the decision maker, someone else responsible for that 
decision or those affected by the decision, cannot or 
have difficulties in assessing. In the following the focus 
will be on political decisions made by politicians on be-
half of others and affecting a third party. Typical cases 
include political decisions with a global reach. I will 
concentrate on one such decision; the European Union 
(EU) “regulation of the European Parliament (EP) and 
of the Council of 16 September 2009 on trade in seal 
products” (EP & Council, 2009). This regulation has 
been criticised by representatives of countries outside 
the EU for being based on emotions and not facts. 
What we have then is a political decision partly de-
pendent on expert knowledge, that some claim was 
not made based on expert knowledge.  
In a recent comment Canada’s Fisheries Minister 
Gail Shea argued that the seal ban was based on emo-
tions, and had “no basis in fact or in science”. 1 Other 
commentators have made similar statements critical of 
a ban, and a recent article concludes that in the Euro-
pean Parliament “arguments based on scientific inves-
tigations and expert evaluations were downplayed or 
not mentioned at all” and contrary to this “the Com-
mission and Norway/Canada” based their arguments 
on scientific ground, they “spoke the same language” 
in the sense that “they agreed on what represented a 
valid and legitimate argument” (Wegge, 2013, p. 270). 
Thus at least part of this argument is that the Commis-
                                                          
1 Minister Gail Shea said this in relation to a WTO panel re-
quired by Canada to challenge the ban. According to her this 
would help take the emotion out of a ban. Palmer (2011, 
February 11).  
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sion, together with the governments of Norway and 
Canada, “lost the case”2 because the case was not de-
cided by science but by something else, be it issues of 
ethical identity linked to animal welfare, a strategic 
wish for re-election on the part of the EP members, or 
as argued by others and alluded to in the article; emo-
tions.3 
The seal ban case is obviously complicated. As well 
as animal welfare issues, it involves legal issues, Inuit 
people’s rights issues, and resource management is-
sues, to name a few4. In a short paper like this there is 
a need to reduce this complexity. The point of depar-
ture is the observation that the amendments made by 
the EP in the European Parliament’s Draft Regulation 
(Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Pro-
tection [IMCO], 2009) differed substantially from the 
Commission proposal (European Commission [EC], 
2008a) purportedly based on expert knowledge. The 
Commission proposal with these amendments made by 
the EP, by and large, later became the EU regulation on 
a ban. Moreover, as Wegge (2013, p. 270) states: “the 
lobbying strategies towards the Council did not matter 
much in the larger picture, as the Parliament was 
acknowledged by all to be the lead institution in this 
case”. Thus, even if the regulation was adopted using 
the co-decision procedure, only the Parliament’s argu-
ments will be analyzed. The question is if the amend-
ments made by the European Parliament, amendments 
that in essence later were reflected in the final regula-
tion (EP & Council, 2009), really were made without 
taking into account the expert knowledge available, as 
the critics claim? In relation to the Commission’s exclu-
sive right5 to submit a legislative proposal, the Com-
mission provides expert knowledge in support of EU 
decision-making (European Commission [EC], 2002). 
This means that the Commission, in submitting a pro-
posal for a regulation, may issue an explanatory state-
ment, often, as in the seal ban case, based on internal 
and external expert advice. The question asked is if the 
European Parliament took this expert knowledge into 
account or not when reaching a different conclusion 
than the Commission?  
In order to arrive at a different result to those of 
the experts while still respecting expert knowledge, 
there will have to be a way for non-experts, in this case 
members of the European Parliament, to legitimately 
test the expert knowledge. Three main tests and ten 
subtests will be proposed as possible candidates. The 
                                                          
2 In the sense that the original Commission proposal was 
changed substantially to the effect of banning most products 
from commercial seal hunt from the EU market.  
3 For similar arguments see Perišin (2013, pp. 375, 395-396). 
4 See for example Fitzgerald (2011), Howse and Langille 
(2012), Perišin (2013), Nielsen and Calle (2013) and Cambou 
(2013). 
5 With some exceptions. 
general question then is if non-experts may realistically 
conduct such tests. 
If the European Parliament actually did test the ex-
pert knowledge this should be revealed in the amend-
ments made to the Commission proposal by the EP. 
Thus, the document that will be used to capture the 
European Parliament’s view on the ban is the report 
delivered by the responsible committee in Parliament, 
the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection (IMCO, 2009) containing the “Draft Europe-
an Parliament Legislative Resolution” concerning trade 
in seal products, the Commission proposal for a regula-
tion, the opinions of the Committee on the Environ-
ment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI, 26.1.2009) 
and the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment (AGRI, 18.2.2009), as well as the explanatory 
statements from the rapporteurs for the three commit-
tees. Thus in what follows IMCO (2009), containing 
these different documents, will be the main reference 
to the European Parliament’s arguments. The emphasis 
will be on the amendments suggested by the different 
parliamentary committees and the justifications for 
these.  
In a highly politicised and epistemically complicated 
case like the one discussed here, there may be reason-
able disagreement on the issue of who the real experts 
are and as to what should be considered reliable 
knowledge. The point of reference in the following will 
be the knowledge provided by the Commission in the 
Commission’s “Explanatory Memorandum” in the pro-
posal for a regulation on a ban (EC, 2008a), an accom-
panying Commission Staff “Working Document” on the 
potential impact of a ban (EC, 2008b) and the two ex-
pert reports (European Food Safety Authority [EFSA], 
2007; COWI, 2008) ordered by the Commission. The 
Commission formulated its proposal for a ban based on 
this. The Parliament reached a different conclusion to 
that of the Commission. The question is if the Parlia-
ments conclusion is compatible with the expert 
knowledge that the Commission based its proposal on.  
As indicated, this case is complicated as a host of 
different interests and goals were activated at different 
times in the decision making process (Sellheim, 2014). I 
will concentrate on the animal welfare aspects of the 
case that dominated both the expert reports and the 
discussion in Parliament (IMCO, 2009). The aim is lim-
ited to finding out if the Parliament used the expert 
knowledge made available by the Commission in 
amending the Commission proposal on issues linked to 
animal welfare, not the larger issue of whether the 
regulation as such was right, just or correct from the 
perspective of EU law, international trade regulations, 
resource management or the rights of indigenous peo-
ples, to name some of the issues at stake in this case.  
The expectation is that the Parliament, in amending 
the Commission proposal and arguing in favour of a 
stricter ban, in some way would take into account the 
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expert knowledge provided by the Commission. Still, 
how can politicians, here considered non-experts, chal-
lenge a decision based on expert knowledge; that is, 
test whether the expert knowledge is correct, accurate, 
relevant, sufficient, consistent with the conclusions 
reached, and so on? Generally speaking, is it at all pos-
sible for non-experts to hold experts accountable, and 
if so in what way? Expert knowledge gives legitimacy to 
political decisions, but so does public opinion. When 
these two clash, as has apparently been the case when 
it comes to the seal products ban, one may expect le-
gitimacy to be restored only by reconciling the two; ei-
ther by a reconsideration of the expert knowledge in-
volved or through a change in public opinion. I will 
concentrate on the former. The general question ad-
dressed then is whether or not the European Parliament 
was able to reconcile these two bases of legitimacy by 
way of the available expert knowledge. This will be 
done by considering if any of the ten tests developed 
(section three) were in fact conducted by the European 
Parliament (section four), but first a brief outline of the 
decision making process (section two). 
2. The Decision Making Process 
The political decision making process can, in brief, be 
described in five steps.6 First, the initiative leading up 
to a declaration on seal hunting in the European Par-
liament (European Parliament [EP], 2006) in September 
2006 was based on pressure from civil society organi-
sations and backed up by a large majority in the Euro-
pean Parliament. Second, the Commission accepted 
that this was a matter to be decided at the EU level 
with reference to the need for consistent legal rules 
throughout the common market. Some member states 
had already passed laws banning seal products and 
other member states had made plans to do so.  
As indicated, the Commission ordered two separate 
expert investigations into the matter, one linked to ani-
mal welfare under the Directorate General for Environ-
ment, conducted by the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA, 2007), and another on the possible impacts of a 
ban conducted by external experts (COWI, 2008).  
The result of this process was a proposal to ban the 
import and placing on the market of seal products 
throughout the EU, but with potentially wide ranging 
exceptions being made for seals that were killed with-
out avoidable pain, what will be referred to as the 
Commission proposal (EC, 2008a). In practice this 
would mean that a large seal hunting country, such as 
Canada (as argued by the rapporteur for the responsi-
ble committee, Diana Wallis, in her “Explanatory 
Statement” criticising the Commission proposal) 
                                                          
6 For a more comprehensive description of this process see 
Howse and Langille (2012), Wegge (2013) and Sellheim 
(2014).  
(IMCO, 2009, p. 28), might well have been exempted 
from the ban. The proposal, according to the Commis-
sion, besides the formal objective of market harmoni-
sation, had two “overarching objectives” that is; first, 
to “protect seals from acts that cause them avoidable 
pain, distress, fear, and other forms of suffering during 
the killing and skinning process”, and second, “to ad-
dress the concerns of the general public with regard to 
the killing and skinning of seals” (EC, 2008b, pp. 23, 51).  
Third, on 5 March 2009 IMCO, as the responsible 
committee, issued its amendments to the Commission 
proposal for a ban. Four committees had been asked 
for opinions. As indicated, in the end, two committees 
(ENVI and AGRI) of four issued opinions to the respon-
sible committee (IMCO). All three committees (IMCO, 
ENVI and AGRI) issued justificatory or explanatory 
statements and proposed concrete amendments to the 
Commission proposal (IMCO, 2009).7 As stated, the end 
result of these amendments to the Commission pro-
posal for a ban was that the European Parliament rec-
ommended a much stricter ban.  
Both at the second stage and this third stage was 
civil society actively involved. The animal welfare 
movement, but also those arguing against a ban had 
their say, and formal meetings with different stake-
holders were conducted. These included indigenous 
peoples representatives and consultations involving 
experts from seal hunting nations like Norway and 
Canada.8 
Fourth, the European Parliament adopted the regu-
lation with a massive majority. The Council adopted 
the regulation with three countries abstaining (Wegge, 
2013, p. 268). The result was a total ban, but with an 
exception for indigenous people, showing that the lob-
bying had been effective in the sense that an exemp-
tion was made for hunting based on justifications 
linked to cultural survival. An exemption was even 
made for non-commercial resource management hunt-
ing, and for products carried into the European Union 
                                                          
7 In addition, the Committee on Legal Affairs later (1 April 
2009), on its own initiative, issued an opinion on the legal ba-
sis of the proposed regulation. 
8 As stated by the Commission: “The stakeholders were invit-
ed to express their opinion on the completeness and reliabil-
ity of the data presented in the draft report prepared by the 
EFSA working group, in order to avoid any possibility of leav-
ing out some important scientific evidence. Moreover, the 
European Commission organised a workshop with experts 
from sealing countries, animal welfare non-governmental or-
ganisations as well as fur trade and hunters associations with 
the objective to receive feedback on the factual information 
under the country reporting exercise (national hunt man-
agement systems) conducted in the framework of the overall 
Commission assessment. Bilateral meetings were also held 
with a range of stakeholders, and took place at a political, as 
well as at a technical level.“ (EC, 2008a, p. 9, see also EC, 
2008b, p. 12) 
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that were bought elsewhere and were for private use 
only. The final EU regulation on principle followed the 
Commission proposal as amended by the European 
Parliament; a total ban with exemptions for indigenous 
peoples and non-commercial resource management 
hunting.  
Fifth, the regulation was challenged in court both at 
the European level and the global level. At the Europe-
an level the General Court concluded the regulation to 
be legal (European General Court [EGC], 2013) and the 
European Court of Justice subsequently denied an ap-
peal (European Court of Justice [ECJ], 2013). At the 
global level the WTO Appellate Body, based on com-
plaints from Norway and Canada, issued its report on 
May 22, 2014 (World Trade Organization [WTO], 2014). 
According to one interpretation, the Appellate Body 
found that “some aspects of the EU Seal Regime were 
discriminatory,” but also that “the measure was provi-
sionally justified under the public morals exception” 
(Howse, Langille, & Sykes, 2014), in general meaning 
that the ban on products from commercial seal hunt is 
acceptable, while the exemptions made had not been 
fairly applied. Thus legally speaking, one may argue 
that the EU lost the case since the EU Seal Regime was 
deemed discriminatory (Fitzgerald, 2014). Howse et al. 
(2014) on the other hand argue that, “these concerns 
should be relatively easy for the EU to address”. The 
practical result of this decision is most likely that the 
EU seal ban, at least in relation to large-scale commer-
cial seal hunt, will continue. The media and many of 
those in favour of a ban, most notably animal rights or-
ganisations, have interpreted the decision as a (EU) vic-
tory, while many of those opposed to a ban, most no-
tably representatives of indigenous communities, have 
criticised the decision. The Canadian Government, in a 
brief news release after the Appellate Body’s decision, 
understandably was more reluctant to draw any firm 
conclusions, but relevant to this paper repeated that 
“The ban on seal products adopted in the European 
Union was a political decision that has no basis in fact 
or science” (Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and 
Development Canada, 2014). No doubt the EU ban on 
seal products was a political decision, the question is if 
it really did not have any basis in fact or science? 
3. Epistemic Dependence and Politics 
Decisions made in a democracy may be more or less 
dependent on expert knowledge. What then decides 
the level of epistemic dependence? I suggest two di-
mensions, first the epistemic requirements in order to 
make a decision, and second, the epistemic transpar-
ency of a decision. By epistemic requirement I under-
stand how much and varied expertise is needed in or-
der to make a rational decision and the practical 
availability of this expertise. Generally speaking, the 
less expertise needed and the more available the ex-
pertise, the less epistemic dependence. By epistemic 
transparency I mean the degree to which it is possible 
to validate the expert knowledge by non-experts (in-
cluding the degree to which knowledge is openly ac-
cessible to everyone). Generally speaking the lower the 
level of transparency, the higher the level of epistemic 
dependence. Epistemic dependence then, when mak-
ing a decision, is determined on the one hand by the 
level of expertise needed and if it is readily available, 
and on the other hand the possibility to confirm if the 
expert knowledge is correct and precise enough to be 
useful for a particular purpose. In the following I will 
concentrate on this latter practical epistemological as-
pect of epistemic dependence.  
In a modern society there is typically a high degree 
of epistemic dependence not only when it comes to 
the relationship between experts and non-experts, but 
also among experts. This may be seen as a problem 
when it comes to democratic decision-making. Accord-
ing to Hardwig (1985) however, a person can make ra-
tional decisions based on information this person can-
not personally validate. Moreover, a person who trusts 
his or her own instincts or conclusions over those of a 
trustworthy and competent expert is irrational. Hard-
wig’s point is that people in a modern world, inside and 
outside science, to a large extent will have to trust es-
tablished scientific results in order to have rational be-
liefs. Thus, applying Hardwig’s “principle of testimony”, 
“if A has good reason to believe that B has good reason 
to believe p, then A has good reason to believe p” 
(Hardwig, 1985, p. 336, 1991, p. 697), and A’s believes 
are on principle rational even if p occasionally may turn 
out to be wrong. If the opposite were to be true, that 
this makes A irrational based on an individualist epis-
temology that says that you may only rationally believe 
what you yourself have proven true or right, most of 
modern science and most of people’s believes in gen-
eral will be irrational. That the number of dependen-
cies, even among experts, only increases with the de-
velopment of modern science adds to the complexities 
involved (e.g. If A has good reason to believe that B has 
good reason to believe that C has good reason to be-
lieve that D has good reason to believe (and so on) p; 
where B, C and D (and so on) are experts) (Hardwig, 
1985, 1991).  
This however does not necessarily mean that ex-
perts may always be trusted and that politicians and 
other citizens have no responsibility when it comes to 
evaluating experts and expert knowledge. A non-expert 
should have good reason to believe that an expert has 
good reason to believe something. The question is how 
a non-expert may establish a good reason to believe 
that an expert has good reason to believe something. 
Inspired by Hardwig’s sceptical view (1985), but mainly 
indebted to Melissa Lane’s (2014)9 recent review of the 
                                                          
9 Melissa Lane, in her comparisons of different views on how 
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current literature on the subject I have tentatively es-
tablished three general “tests” a concerned party may 
conduct; a first order quality test, a second order quali-
ty test, and a bias test. Based on these distinctions we 
may roughly specify at least ten subtests that may be 
conducted in order to try to substantiate or challenge 
the expert view (see Table 1). In the following a brief 
explanation of these tests are given and possible tenta-
tive examples relating to the ban on seal products in 
the EU are indicated.  
Table 1. Three basic tests and ten subtests of expert 
knowledge.  
First Order 
Quality Tests 
Second Order 
Quality Tests 
Bias Tests 
1. Examining the 
practical results 
of expert 
knowledge 
2. Examining the 
content of expert 
knowledge 
3. Examining the 
evaluative 
standard used by 
the expert 
4. Communication 
by experts of 
expert knowledge 
5. Expert 
recognition 
6. Agreement 
among experts 
7. Bias linked to 
relational norms 
and values 
8. Bias linked to 
material interests 
9. Psychological 
bias 
10. Political bias 
3.1. First Order Quality Tests 
A first order quality test involves first an examination 
of the practical results of expert knowledge, second, an 
examination of the content of the knowledge, third an 
examination of the evaluative standards involved and 
fourth an examination of the expert’s ability to com-
municate this knowledge in a way that makes it under-
standable to non-experts. It is a first order test because 
it aims at a more or less direct assessment of the quali-
ty of the knowledge involved. In the first subtest (1) 
one has to presume that even though the non-expert 
does not fully understand or may be totally ignorant 
about the epistemic base of a particular decision the 
practical results may be evaluated according to differ-
ent standards. If the expert’s predictions come true (or 
clearly do not) the epistemic dependence may in some 
instances be reduced to a level where trust is not any 
longer an issue.  
(1) The EP found that the expert proposal does not 
work as intended. 
In the second subtest (2) the presumption is that even 
                                                                                           
citizens may evaluate the claims of scientific experts, draws 
mainly on LaBarge (1997), Goldman (2001), Anderson (2011), 
and Brewer (1998). 
though the non-expert may not fully grasp the explana-
tions given by the expert, the non-expert may never 
the less be able to reduce the level of epistemic de-
pendence through investigating parts of the explana-
tions involved, for example try to establish the level of 
uncertainty linked to the expert knowledge or more 
generally by assessing the relative accuracy of a partic-
ular field of expertise. Uncertainties are almost always 
present to some degree, but both the type of uncer-
tainty and the level of uncertainty differ (Lane, 2014).  
(2) The EP found that the expert proposal was based 
on irrelevant or too uncertain scientific evidence.  
The third subtest (3) is based on the premise that ex-
pert knowledge involves an evaluative standard. This 
evaluative standard may be constitutive of the 
knowledge in question or it may be more contingent, 
as when the expert mandate establishes a particular 
evaluative standard and in the process determines to 
some degree what expert knowledge is relevant. In ei-
ther case non-experts may question the relevance of 
the standard used relative to a particular political issue.  
(3) The EP found the evaluative standard used by 
the experts wanting.  
The fourth subtest (4) arguably linked to the first three 
subtests, presupposes that an expert is able to explain 
to others in a relatively clear and understandable way 
what knowledge they possess and in so doing is able to 
justify the relevance of this knowledge relative to the 
decision being made. A willingness and ability to do 
this in an understandable way will reduce epistemic 
dependence.  
(4) The EP found that the expert opinion was un-
clear and difficult to understand and as a result the 
relevance of the expert knowledge was not appro-
priately justified.  
In sum we may ask to what degree it is possible for a 
non-expert to even understand in any depth the prem-
ises of the conclusions reached by experts (Hardwig, 
1985). This will differ from one type of expert 
knowledge to the next, but the premise in relation to 
the first order quality test is that some knowledge is 
better than no knowledge, and that the easier it is to 
understand the practical results, the logic behind ex-
pert knowledge, in addition to the standards of evalua-
tion used, the less the epistemic dependence. After all, 
one reason why political scientists and others are pre-
occupied with how much knowledge people in general 
have on different politically relevant issues, for exam-
ple climate change (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012), is be-
cause they believe they can use this as an indication of 
a population’s ability to understand and make up an 
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opinion on an issue (Estlund, 2008, p. 260). In the seal 
ban case the claim has been made that people in gen-
eral are not rational in making up their minds on the is-
sue of seal hunt because they lack knowledge and hold 
false beliefs concerning how seal hunting is conducted 
(Perišin, 2013, p. 396). 
3.2. Second Order Quality Tests  
A second order quality test is based on the belief that 
there are reasons to trust that institutional structure; 
other experts and personal qualities of the experts may 
assure that expert knowledge is trustworthy. The fifth 
subtest (5) is premised on the belief in institutions 
(based on rules, ethical standards and sanctions) such 
as universities, expert commissions, peer-review, pub-
lic track records and collegial credentials to produce 
trustworthy knowledge. It may also depend on person-
al traits such as proven trustworthiness. This should 
give the expert some unbiased credentials that the 
public may trust and thus reduce the problem of epis-
temic dependence.  
(5) The EP challenged the experts with reference to 
their professional credentials.  
The sixth subtest (6) is premised on the view that disa-
greement among experts makes epistemic dependen-
cies more problematic, given it is impossible through a 
first order quality test or subtest five to decide who is 
most trustworthy. This does not mean that agreement 
implies that the expert knowledge is always correct, 
only that for non-experts not to trust such knowledge, 
without further qualification, is irrational.  
(6) The EP referred to or engaged alternative ex-
perts with a different view than those engaged by 
the Commission.  
Even the second order quality test is imperfect, but the 
general presumption is that the better the institutional 
safeguards when it comes to controlling expert 
knowledge in a society and the more there is agree-
ment among experts, the less problematic is epistemic 
dependence.  
The first order quality tests and the second order 
quality tests are positive in the sense that they aim at 
making sure the expert knowledge is correct. In addi-
tion to these two tests and independent of the results 
of these tests, an additional “negative” test should be 
conducted; a bias test. It is negative in the sense that it 
aims at discovering non-scientific reasons not to trust 
the expert knowledge under scrutiny.  
3.3. Bias Test  
A bias test involves trying to assess if expert advice is in 
some way affected by non-scientific or non-expert con-
cerns. According to the seventh subtest (7) expert 
knowledge may be affected by relational ties as when 
colleagues or friends cover for each other, when argu-
ments are not communicated in fear of embarrassment 
for some experts involved, concerns for the expertʼs 
reputation if proven that some results are incorrect, 
protection of oneʼs colleagues, that the research has 
fallen victim to groupthink and so on. This test is noto-
riously difficult to conduct by non-experts.  
(7) The EP argued that the experts involved in the 
process consisted of a group of people with relative-
ly tight relational ties and with a common and posi-
tive view on seal hunting. 
The eighth subtest (8) is more straightforward and in-
volves possible material benefits the experts may gain 
from promoting certain results and subduing others 
(more or less consciously). There may be reason not to 
trust the information due to factors such as suspicion 
that the research is unduly interest driven, that it gives 
in to different external pressures or internal interests, 
like concerns for further research funding or work op-
portunities more generally. Even this confidence test is 
difficult to conduct; still sometimes such investigations 
at least may give reason for scepticism.  
(8) The EP challenged the experts on the ground 
that they had previous economic ties with seal hunt-
ing and depended on this for their professional ca-
reer, especially focusing on advice emerging from 
experts representing seal hunting nations.  
The ninth subtest (9) is basically psychological and is 
linked to experimental findings that humans, including 
experts in their capacity as experts, tend to interpret 
the world differently dependent on factors such as 
changes in how information is presented, the circum-
stances under which the information is presented or 
some inbuilt preferences for some information rather 
than other. Such effect as the framing effect, wishful 
thinking, confirmation bias and others will generally in-
crease the problem of epistemic dependence, but 
awareness of such biases and efforts to overcome 
them, for example through reframing, may to a degree 
at least partly compensate for this.10  
(9) The EP argues that the expert opinion is unduly 
affected by the framing of the killing of seals as 
hunting and proposes a reframing emphasising the 
killing as slaughter.  
Political bias, the tenth subtest (10), means that the 
work of experts may in some way be unduly affected 
                                                          
10 For a review see Gowdy (2008). 
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by the experts’ personal political point of view, by 
power politics more generally or institutional epistemic 
doctrines bordering on the political.  
(10) The EP would argue that the experts are tied to 
and dependent on a relatively small sector likely to 
colour their political view or that the expert pro-
posal is based on too liberal a view of free trade and 
a political reading of the possible legal reactions to 
a more extensive ban.  
4. To What Extent Did the European Parliament Test 
the Expert Knowledge? 
The European Parliament reached a different conclu-
sion than the Commission and the question is if these 
different conclusions are consistent with the facts as 
presented by the experts or in some way legitimately 
challenge these facts. Does the European Parliament 
argue in consequentialist terms and engage the scien-
tific evidence? If not, if it all comes down to emotions, 
identity or strategic manoeuvrings, it would seem that 
the European Parliament is factually irrational. Is a 
more charitable interpretation possible? One that 
makes more sense of the fact that the EP rejected the 
positions of the Commission, Norway and Canada? 
Again, the question asked here is not what the correct 
decision should be, obviously people disagree on this, 
the question is if the EP presented arguments that in 
some way related to, took into account or criticised the 
expert knowledge relating to animal welfare? More 
concretely, the question is which of the ten tests, if 
any, the EP conducted? 
4.1. First Order Quality Tests 
In the seal ban case the Commission proposal was nev-
er implemented and the EP had no way of deciding if it 
actually worked or not; that is if it had resulted in less 
or no avoidable suffering for the seals and at the same 
time had satisfied the public. The EP then could not re-
ally conclude decisively on the first subtest. What the 
EP did however was to conduct an abstract test. They 
simply did not believe that the measures proposed by 
the experts would have the predicted effects. Even if 
we implement these measures the EP argued, seals will 
still suffer and people will not be satisfied. This did not 
mean that the EP rejected the expert view that it may 
be possible to kill seals without them suffering. The 
opinion of ENVI argued in the following way; “The 
question here is not whether seals can be killed hu-
manely in theory but if they can be consistently killed 
humanely in the field environment in which seal hunt 
occur” (IMCO, 2009, p. 37). In the final regulation, the 
wording was as follows: “Although it might be possible 
to kill and skin seals in such a way as to avoid unneces-
sary pain, distress, fear or other forms of suffering, giv-
en the conditions in which seal hunting occurs, con-
sistent verification and control of hunters’ compliance 
with animal welfare requirements is not feasible in prac-
tice or, at least, is very difficult to achieve in an effective 
way, as concluded by the European Food Safety Authori-
ty on 6 December 2007” (EP & Council, 2009, p. 37).  
In applying the second subtest the non-expert will 
look at the content of the expert’s opinion and ask if 
the measures proposed in its name can be trusted to 
achieve the purpose of a political proposition. The ex-
pert knowledge used to justify a decision may be scru-
tinised by non-experts in order to, for example, decide 
the relevance and uncertainties of the expert 
knowledge. In the seal ban case, the responsible com-
mittee claimed “there is clear evidence that seals killed 
in commercial seal hunts consistently suffer pain, dis-
tress and other form[s] of suffering” (IMCO, 2009, p. 7). 
The Commission proposal at this point referred directly 
to the EFSA report in arguing “that it is possible to kill 
seals rapidly and effectively without causing them 
avoidable pain or distress, whilst also reporting that in 
practice, effective and humane killing does not always 
happen” (IMCO, 2009, p. 7). In the actual report EFSA 
in its conclusion writes, “There is strong evidence that, 
in practice, effective killing does not always occur…” 
(EFSA, 2007, p. 94). One may argue that the EP formu-
lation gives the impression that every seal always suf-
fers when killed, but it is also possible to interpret it to 
the effect that whenever seal hunt takes place a fair 
amount of the animals will in fact suffer. The problem 
here is that the facts as reported by the two expert re-
ports are unclear and inconclusive. There is simply not 
enough research that has been done on the actual suf-
fering of seals and the research that has been conduct-
ed suffers from various methodological deficiencies. 
Moreover, the different veterinary experts’ opinions on 
the Canadian seal hunt, reviewed by the EFSA, disa-
gree. The European Parliament, in order to substanti-
ate its amendments to the Commission proposal em-
pirically, may have referred to one or more of the more 
critical studies on Canadian seal hunt with citations 
from the EFSA report like: “existing regulations are nei-
ther respected or enforced” and commercial seal hunt 
“results in considerable and unacceptable suffering” 
(EFSA, 2007; p. 59, Burdon et al., 2001), or “there was 
widespread disregard for the Marin[e] Mammal Regu-
lations by sealers” and “a minimum of 82% of shot 
seals were not killed by the first shot” (EFSA, 2007, p. 
55; Butterworth, Gallego, Gregory, Harris, & Soulsbury, 
2007). The point here is not to argue that the EP for-
mulation in some way was more accurate or correct 
than the formulation proposed by the Commission, on-
ly that both formulations arguably may be defended 
based on the expert knowledge provided by the EFSA 
report.  
The responsible committee similarly argued that 
“humane killing methods cannot be effectively and 
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consistently applied”, that “effective monitoring” of 
seal hunting would be “impossible” and that “only a 
comprehensive ban…would meet the citizens’ de-
mands to see an end to the trade in seal products” 
(IMCO, 2009, p. 11). The first part of this argument is 
hard to substantiate by experts since no one can know 
what may or may not be possible in the future when it 
comes to seal hunting. On a charitable reading the Eu-
ropean Parliament may be seen to argue that there are 
already comprehensive rules linked to seal hunting in 
Canada; there is enough evidence that these rules are 
not always followed in practice and that as a result 
seals do suffer. It would be unlikely therefore that bet-
ter rules would give a much better result.  
When it comes to the second part of the argument 
linked to the stated objective to convince the public 
that seal hunt is humanely conducted, this offers more 
empirical problems for experts and parliamentarians 
alike. The premise that the public actually wants a ban 
is open to discussion based on the expert studies. The 
COWI report covers this issue in some detail with ref-
erence to the public consultation procedure conducted 
by the Commission. People were asked to answer a 
questionnaire on a voluntary basis (questions only in 
English) and the consultation was placed on the net 
and was open for eight weeks (20.12.07–13.2.08).  
73.153 persons from 160 different countries respond-
ed to the inquiry (COWI, 2008, p. 125), of these 32.061 
from the EU member states (COWI, 2008, p. 129).  
This of course is not a scientific study on the public 
attitude in the EU towards seal hunting, as clearly stat-
ed by COWI (2008, p. 124). However, the report con-
tinues to present the results in a way that may easily 
come across as scientific in form and concludes in its 
final recommendation to the Commission that “…it 
must be acknowledged that the public perception of 
seal hunting at large is against seal hunting for principal 
reasons…” (COWI, 2008, p. 136). If the public is seen as 
equated with the people answering the questionnaire, 
the European Parliament is probably right in arguing 
that the public will not be convinced by the Commission 
proposal. Of the respondent from the 27 EU member 
states 72.5% “Do not accept hunt on principle” about 
the same percentage that are in favour of a strict ban 
(73.0%) (COWI, 2008, p. 129). The Commission is more 
positive to the prospects of convincing the public 
through information campaigns. This conclusion is partly 
based on the fact that even people most interested in 
the issue of seal hunting (those that answered) are 
largely misinformed on the methods used to hunt seals. 
Again it is difficult to determine based on the expert 
knowledge provided who is right here, the Commission 
or the European Parliament. The main point is that part 
of the Parliament’s justification may be reasonably de-
fended with reference to the premises laid down in the 
COWI report and reported by the Commission as an in-
dication of the public view (EC, 2008b, p. 11).  
In addition, the EP may have argued more forceful-
ly11, as the EU later argued in its first written submis-
sion to the WTO (European Union [EU], 2012, p. 24), 
that opinion polls in some EU countries showed that 
the public is opposed to a ban. These, opinion polls 
cannot however, while applying the same strict scien-
tific criteria as those used by the EFSA, represent the 
entire population of the EU. Moreover, these opinion 
polls were mostly commissioned by IFAW, an organisa-
tion that, according to its own homepage, was “found-
ed in 1969 to stop” the “cruel hunt for seals” (Interna-
tional Fund for Animal Welfare, [IFAW], n.d.). This does 
not necessarily imply a lack of trust in a market re-
search company like Ipsos-MORI that in 2011 conduct-
ed a survey for IFAW on the seal ban. Even though this 
survey was conducted after the EU regulation was 
adopted, the survey may still be used to illustrate the 
difficulties involved in getting reliable and independent 
data on a highly politicised issue like the EU seal ban, in 
particular maybe when the clients have a vested inter-
est in one particular result. Ipsos-MORI conducted a 
survey for IFAW including eleven EU countries. Five 
hundred interviews were made in each country. The 
survey found that the support for a ban was over-
whelming with 56% answering that they “Strongly sup-
port” a ban. Prior to answering the question the re-
spondents were read a statement, which according to 
Ipsos-MORI provided “respondents with some infor-
mation on commercial seal hunting and the EU ban on 
the sale of seal products” (Ipsos-MORI, 2011, p. 1). In-
terestingly, in Great Britain half of the survey was con-
ducted with the introductory statement and half with-
out it.12 With the introductory statement 56% (the 
same as in all countries combined) were “strongly op-
posed” to a ban. Without the introduction this dropped 
to 46%, while the “Neither/nor” or “Don’t know/no 
opinion” options combined increased by 10%. As sug-
gested by subtest nine, this illustrates the well-known 
insight that the ways questions are framed heavily in-
fluence the answers you get. One may of course argue 
that those with better information were more sceptical 
to seal hunt, but then again, one has to decide if the in-
formation given in the introductory statement was suf-
ficiently balanced.  
In order to document the lack of knowledge in a 
certain field of inquiry one clearly needs experts as 
demonstrated in this case. Most of the experts’ reports 
however concerned what is actually known and that 
would be relevant for the decision of a ban. This exper-
tise was basically linked to the effectiveness of differ-
ent killing methods and rules regulating seal hunt in 
different countries. The goal was to come up with best 
                                                          
11 This was argued by Rapporteur Frieda Brepoels in her justi-
ficatory statement for the ENVI (IMCO, 2009, p. 32). 
12 The sample size in Great Britain was double of that in the 
other countries surveyed (1004 respondents). 
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practices that could be used to establish a regulatory 
regime that could in turn be used by the EU to decide 
what hunting should be accepted and what not. This is-
sue is intimately linked to subtest three. 
Subtest three is about the evaluative standards 
used by the experts, whether these standards are in-
herent to the field of expertise or are linked to the 
mandate given to the experts by political authority. In 
the seal ban case the EP criticised the Commission for 
the mandate given to the experts and even the EFSA 
for its recommended method for killing seals humane-
ly. In its justification the responsible committee wrote: 
“The Commission did not ask EFSA to assess whether 
commercial seal hunt is currently conducted in a hu-
mane fashion, but rather the most appropriate killing 
methods for seals to reduce as much as possible un-
necessary pain, distress and suffering. The killing 
methods recommended in EFSA’s report and the draft 
Regulation do not prescribe humane killing as any rep-
utable veterinary authority would define it” (IMCO, 
2009, p. 8). Based on its findings (best practices) EFSA 
suggested establishing rules and regulations that as far 
as possible would relieve the seals of suffering. For the 
responsible committee however this was not enough. 
The committee went on to criticise not only the man-
date, but also the criteria for what suffering should 
mean. It argues, “The concern of European citizens is 
about a trade involving suffering of wild animals, not 
only suffering which is avoidable. Unavoidable suffer-
ing may be very considerable.” (IMCO, 2009, p. 8). This 
is also later linked to the second main objective; that of 
convincing the public that the regulation of a ban 
would improve the situation to their satisfaction. The 
responsible committee argues, “the removal of the 
word ʻavoidableʼ is warranted since all the evidence in-
dicates that EC citizens are concerned about the suffer-
ing caused by the hunting of seals, not only suffering 
which is avoidable” (IMCO, 2009, p. 11). The ENVI justi-
fied this in the following manner: “Unavoidable suffer-
ing may be very considerable given the term is not 
quantifiable” (IMCO, 2009, p. 38). Thus the committee 
refuted the evaluative standard used by the Commis-
sion and the experts alike and opted for a no suffering 
standard.  
The result of this stricter standard, in addition to 
the results of the European Parliament’s arguments in 
relation to the two first subtests, was that much of the 
references to the experts’ knowledge or conclusions 
based on expert knowledge were deleted from the 
Commission proposal by the Parliament. Much of the 
expert knowledge provided by the Commission and the 
experts’ reports, were deemed largely irrelevant. 
Subtest four is about the way experts are able to 
communicate and thus justify the conclusions reached, 
to the non-expert. In this case there is no indication 
that the EP did not understand or more directly criti-
cised the experts involved on this account.  
The first order quality test then seems to have 
mixed results. What stands out is rather the lack of 
proper expert knowledge than the Parliament’s lack of 
empirical references. The facts simply were not very 
clear. When it comes to consequentialist arguing rela-
tive to the first of the two “overarching objectives” for 
the ban (EC, 2008b, p. 7), the one linked to animal wel-
fare, the Parliament may be seen to argue as convinc-
ingly as the Commission. The Commission argued that 
strict demands for detailed and enforceable rules for 
how to conduct seal hunt would give seal hunting na-
tions an incentive to clean up their act. The Parliament 
came to the conclusion that the link between formal 
regulations and actual practice was hard to establish, 
and instead argued that a strict ban would lead to less 
hunting, and less hunting to less suffering. That the 
Parliament had a point is shown by the dramatic drop 
in the number and the price of landed seals in New-
foundland in the aftermath of the Parliament’s 2006 in-
itiative to establish a ban (Sellheim, 2014). As the final 
regulation for a ban states, “in order to restore con-
sumer confidence…it is also necessary to take action to 
reduce the demand leading to marketing of seal prod-
ucts and, hence, the economic demand driving the 
commercial hunting of seals” (EP & Council, 2009, p. 
37). 
4.2. Second Order Quality Tests and Bias Tests 
The three parliamentary committees that participated 
directly in the discussions on the revision of the Com-
mission proposal for a ban (IMCO, 2009) did not (as re-
vealed by the documents) directly criticise or comment 
on either the credentials of the experts, disagreement 
among experts or at least three of the four bias tests 
proposed. The possible exception is subtest nine which 
relates to a critique that generally would claim that the 
experts or the experts’ knowledge is in some way bi-
ased due to psychological factors that tend to influence 
experts’ and non-experts’ choices. Subtest nine is gen-
erally relevant in this case, as proponents of a ban have 
been criticised for basing their decision on emotions 
and not facts and with giving too much weight to the 
animal welfare issue relative to, for example, the ef-
fects of a ban on indigenous peoples (Cambou, 2013). 
The question I pose here however is if the Parliament, 
as revealed by the arguments presented in the IMCO 
report in some way criticised the expert knowledge for 
being biased in this way. The seal ban case may be 
framed in a number of ways, and the way the issue is 
framed may affect one’s position. As indicated it may 
be framed as a legal issue, as an animal welfare issue, 
as a human welfare issue or as a resource management 
issue, an issue concerning the Arctic region or as a case 
of “public morals,” to name the most obvious.13 The 
                                                          
13 For a discussion on the many and changing goals linked to 
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IMCO report touched on all of these aspects, but no 
doubt the animal welfare issue was the dominant one, 
and so it was for the experts. Both expert reports, and 
in particular EFSA’s, were dominated by this concern. 
Still, the Parliament and the experts, as we have seen, 
framed the animal welfare issue differently. For the 
experts this was a question of making seals suffer as lit-
tle as possible given that seal hunt should continue. For 
the dominant view in the Parliament it was a matter of 
the public perception of the hunt that led them to a 
standard of not making seals suffer at all and made 
amendments to the Commission proposal with the aim 
of possibly stopping seal hunt altogether. As indicated 
only such a strict standard would convince the public 
according to the majority in Parliament, and the public 
seems to have been understood as the people answer-
ing to the Commission’s consultation questionnaire 
and summed up by COWI (2008).  
Regarding the second order quality tests and the 
three remaining bias tests these were not used in the 
arguments presented in the IMCO report. Still, even 
these tests are interesting in the sense that the parlia-
mentary committees may have used them, much in 
line with how these tests and the bias tests actually 
were used by the two expert reports. The expert re-
ports (EFSA, 2007; COWI, 2008) based their findings on 
studies carried out by other experts, and it was the 
quality and possible bias of this research that was sub-
ject to the tests. First, as indicated, peer review was 
seen as a quality criterion, and most of the research 
subjected to scrutiny was not peer reviewed (subtest 
five). Second, the consulted experts disagreed substan-
tially on the question of how much seals in practice suf-
fer when hunted, if regulations are followed in practice 
and if the hunting may be seen as humane (subtest 
six). Third, it was argued that the people doing the re-
search or the people providing the material for the re-
search (e.g., videos of the seal hunt or reports by offi-
cially assigned inspectors of the hunt) could be biased 
due to interest linked to the outcome of the research 
(subtests seven and eight). Finally, since politics is not 
mentioned directly in the experts’ reports it is not pos-
sible to conclude positively on subtest ten. Still, the is-
sue of seal hunt is obviously highly politicised and the 
question as to the widely different interpretation of 
seal hunting practice and the questionable methods 
used leave the impression that at least organisational 
affiliation and politics in a wide sense may have influ-
enced the research and that, whatever research is pre-
sented, a hidden political motive may be suspected 
(subtest ten). Together with the experts’ methodologi-
cal critique of the expert studies (subtest two) all this 
led to the conclusion by EFSA and COWI that the re-
search on the effect of regulations on the practice of 
seal hunting was seriously flawed from the perspective 
                                                                                           
the seal ban case see Sellheim (2014).  
of the goal to get a scientifically valid and unbiased pic-
ture of how humane seal hunt in practice were con-
ducted globally.  
5. Conclusion  
In many ways the decision of a ban may be seen as an 
example of how democratic decisions should be made. 
The decision was democratically initiated, thoroughly 
investigated by experts, civil society was actively in-
volved all through the process, it was decided upon by 
a vast majority of a directly elected body (European 
Parliament), together with an indirectly elected body 
(Council) and finally accepted as legal inside the EU 
(General Court and European Court of Justice) and, at 
least provisionally, at the global level (WTO). Neverthe-
less, the regulation was criticised for not being based 
on the available expert knowledge. Can we conclude 
then that the European Parliament’s justification for a 
strict ban was compatible with the expert knowledge 
available? The short answer is yes.  
Surprisingly, after years of discussions over the seal 
hunt issue, expert knowledge is lacking on the most 
important questions linked to the Commission’s two 
stated “main overarching objectives” (EC, 2008b, p. 7); 
we do not know the degree to which seals suffer when 
killed, or more to the point; the degree to which strict-
er regulations would help, and we do not know based 
on the expert reports, what attitudes EU citizens have 
regarding seal hunt. The European Parliament did not 
test the expert knowledge in the sense of criticising the 
expert findings, but the changes in the Commission 
proposal made by the Parliament and the justifications 
for these may, as argued, be as reasonably defended 
with reference to the available expert knowledge pre-
sented by the experts engaged by the Commission (EF-
SA and COWI) as the Commission proposal, the main 
problem for both the Commission and the Parliament 
being the lack of relevant and valid expert knowledge. 
The COWI report was particularly clear on this issue: 
“…the study cannot on the basis of empirical evidence 
document a possible correlation between legislation 
and practice”, this correlation is rather an assumption 
based on the expectation that under a well functioning 
rule of law system people will follow the law (COWI, 
2008, 19-20). As argued by the EP, this general assump-
tion may reasonably be doubted based on the evidence 
on Canadian seal hunt (as presented by the expert re-
ports), when it comes to the specific issue of seal hunt.  
So are Tenenbaum and Wildawsky (1984, p. 83) 
right that “data do not and cannot determine policy; 
rather, it is the policy perspectives of the participants 
that determine what data are important?” At least this 
case seems to confirm this thesis. One interpretation of 
the Commission proposal is that it started from the 
available data and presented a solution that could be 
backed up with those data. If accepted, “the experts’ 
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perspective” would have prevailed. The European Par-
liament, on the other hand, started with a stated goal 
of no suffering based on public opinion and used the 
data to explain the necessity of a strict ban. In the end 
it was the Parliament’s perspective that prevailed. 
There was little explicit disagreement on the facts or 
the lack thereof. The Parliament, as one might have 
expected from the critique levelled against it, did not 
cherry-pick data in order to make their case, but rather 
based it on the general results presented by the ex-
perts. The question still remains if more data could 
have moved the Parliament to reach a different conclu-
sion? Possibly, with independent and scientifically valid 
detailed data on the public opinion showing an ac-
ceptance for sustainable seal hunt together with robust 
and unanimously accepted data showing that seals 
may be killed, in practice, without suffering. Another 
more basic question still in need of an answer is what 
perspective is most correct from a moral or ethical 
point of view, the experts’ perspective or the European 
Parliament’s?  
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